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This article discusses and analyses the authoritarian dimen-
sion of judicial ideology of the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court. It is based on the empirical research measuring the 
presence of judicial ideology at the Constitutional Court of 
Slovenia in the selected periods of 1993–1997, 2002–2006, 
and 2011–2016 within the first three eight-year mandates. 
The article examines how authoritarian the Slovenian Con-
stitutional Court has been in its judicial decision-making 
during the mentioned years. Our research illustrates that 
all three mandates of the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
show a preference for a central ideological position with 
respect to the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology 
and cannot therefore be described as authoritarian in their 
decision-making.
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1. Introduction1
Fair trial guarantees are the backbone of constitutional democracies and 
the rule of law. Judges of ordinary courts and constitutional courts are 
tasked with safeguarding those guarantees in the domestic systems. As 
a rule, the strength and quality of democratic institutions and the rule 
of law in constitutional democracies depends on the people. The right 
to a fair trial in the judiciaries depends on the people who exercise the 
judicial functions. As a result, safeguarding the right to an impartial and 
independent tribunal as a part of fair trial guarantees is to be particularly 
defended in constitutional democracies. Judges are human beings who 
do not decide cases technically as robots would do artificially (Garoupa, 
2010). They are influenced by the ideology, which is the result of their 
family, private and professional lives and relationships (Letnar Černič, 
12. 7. 2019). Those factors influence their judicial decision-making (ibid). 
As such, every judge shapes their decision-making according to their own 
judicial ideology. Ideology is therefore a seminal factor in judicial deci-
sion-making. 
The Slovenian legal system is an example of the post-socialist legal system 
(Uzelac, 2010). The Slovenian professional associations of judges have 
often argued that they decide cases objectively and are ideologically neu-
tral, thereby explaining that they do not allow interference by any exter-
nal pressures (Letnar Černič, 12. 7. 2019). Nonetheless, an objectivist 
understanding of the application of law does not accurately explain the 
daily realities of the judicial profession (ibid). Every judge has, in her deci-
sion-making, been influenced by various factors from their private, family, 
and professional lives (ibid). Only a robot judge could, perhaps through 
artificial intelligence, decide cases in an ideologically neutral way (Klein-
berg et al., 2018).
1 This article has been written under the auspices of the research project Ideology at 
Courts: The Influence of Judges’ World-views on Their Decisions, Slovenian Research Agency 
(2017–2021), J5-8240 (A) and the research project Holistic Approach to Business and Human 
Rights: A Normative Reform of Slovenian and International Legal Order, Slovenian Research 
Agency (2019–2022, no. JP-1790). 
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The private, family, and professional lives of judges have often been deci-
sive in reaching decisions in judicial disputes (Letnar Černič, 12. 7. 2019). 
They explain whether a particular judge will favour to protect the author-
ity and stability of the legal order or individual rights, whether they will 
favour the rights of the majority or those of the minorities, or whether 
they will protect the free market or state interests (Avbelj & Šušteršič, 
2019, pp. 143–144). For these reasons, Slovenian judges, as other judg-
es, are primarily social beings who are an integral part of the Slovenian 
society, with all its strengths and weaknesses (ibid). That is why the dis-
cursive conception of law more accurately describes features of judicial 
decision-making.
Judicial ideology has been well researched in the United States (Cross & 
Tiller, 1998), but less so in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, where it has often been contended that judges decide cases neu-
trally. Researchers have only recently attempted to measure judicial ideol-
ogy at the highest courts in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanretty, 2014; 
Kantorowicz & Garoupa, 2016; Avbelj, 2019; Avbelj et al., 2018; Szente, 
2016; Pócza, Dobos & Gyulai, 2019; Pócza, Dobos & Gyulai, 2017). This 
article attempts to fill this gap by concentrating on the measurement of 
the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology of the Slovenian Consti-
tutional Court.
The Slovenian system has, like many continental systems, followed the ob-
jectivist conception of the law, which derives its legal authority from the 
legal form and procedure where the norm was developed (Letnar Černič, 
12. 7. 2019; Zobec & Letnar Černič, 2015). The ordinary judiciary in Slo-
venia has been, since independence and democratization, vastly formed 
by the objectivist conception of law. For instance, most of the judgements 
of the ordinary courts are not published, i.e. publicly available (Avbelj & 
Letnar Černič, 2020). As a result, some commentators have argued that 
the ordinary courts have been known to follow formalistic, positivistic, 
and authoritarian judicial decision-making (Avbelj, 2019; Zobec, 2015).
In contrast, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia has been known for the 
transparency of its functioning. Moreover, it has been known for its dis-
cursive approach to law, which emphasizes the importance of legal argu-
mentation. As a rule, its decisions and separate opinions are more likely 
to be scrutinized and discussed among the professional and wider audi-
ences. Hence, the decisions of the Constitutional Court are more open to 
the measurement of the presence of judicial ideology. The Constitutional 
Court of Slovenia has, after democratization and independence, generat-
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ed a paradigm shift in the Slovenian constitutional system by protecting 
individual rights against the heritage of the former authoritarian system 
(Avbelj & Letnar Černič, 2020; Letnar Černič, 2018a; Letnar Černič et 
al., 2018; Letnar Černič, 2018b; Letnar Černič, 2018a; Avbelj, 2018a; 
Avbelj, 2018b).
The judges at the Slovenian Constitutional Court are elected by a simple 
majority by the National Assembly on the proposal of the President of 
the Republic (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Art. 163 (1)). The 
Slovenian Constitutional Court publishes its decisions and separate opin-
ions, thereby enabling measurement of their judicial ideology. Tradition-
ally, most of the judges of the Slovenian Constitutional Court have been 
fond of and have seized the opportunity to write concurring and dissent-
ing separate opinions in order to present arguments for or against the ma-
jority decision (ibid). As a result, the Slovenian Constitutional Court is a 
textbook example for the study, measurement and assessment of judicial 
ideology. However, not much has been published so far on the ideology 
of the Slovenian Constitutional Court (Avbelj et al., 2018).
The Constitutional Court of Slovenia has, in the past three decades, de-
livered several seminal decisions concerning the protection of the rule 
of law, human rights and constitutional democracy. However, not much, 
if anything, has been published as to the reasons and judicial ideology 
that were used to structure those judgements. This article is based on 
the empirical research that measured the presence of judicial ideology at 
the Constitutional Court of Slovenia during three mandates (1993–1997, 
2002–2006, and 2011–2016) (ibid.). It measures the economic, social, 
and authoritarian dimensions of judicial ideology (a three-fold judicial 
ideology model) (Letnar Černič, 22. 3. 2019). What triggers constitution-
al judges to protect individual rights in some cases and in others to show 
preference for the preservation of the authority and stability of the exist-
ing legal system? More specifically, the main research question of this ar-
ticle is how authoritarian has the Slovenian Constitutional Court been in 
its judicial decision-making during the analysed periods. The objective is 
to present the results obtained from measuring the ideological profiles of 
the Court and its individual judges relating to the authoritarian dimension 
of judicial ideology. These empirical results will help the research group 
to develop guidelines for improving judicial-making at the Constitutional 
Court based on the values of the rule of law, constitutional democracy, 
and human dignity in order to ensure the impartial and independent func-
tioning of the judicial system and individual judges.
737
























This research is based on a previously developed multidimensional meth-
odological approach that enables the measurement of judicial ideology in 
the Slovenian Constitutional Court (Avbelj & Šušteršič, 2019). The meth-
odological approach that has been employed is perhaps unconventional, 
as the majority of the literature on judicial ideology employs the one-di-
mensional approach (Bailey, 2016). Nonetheless, judicial decision-mak-
ing is affected by various values, opinions and beliefs, thereby requiring a 
multidimensional approach to measuring judicial ideology. In order to ac-
curately measure judicial ideology at the Slovenian Constitutional Court, 
we measured three different dimensions of judicial ideology (Avbelj et 
al., 2018; Avbelj 2019; Avbelj & Šušteršič, 2019). The multi-dimensional 
model was divided into an economic, social, and authoritarian dimension 
of judicial ideology. In this way, we measured different aspects and nu-
ances of the decision-making at the Slovenian Constitutional Court in 
order to obtain a complete picture of its judicial ideology. We examined 
and coded the decisions of five selected years during the first three man-
dates of the Constitutional Court (1993–1997, during the first mandate, 
2002–2006, during the second mandate, and 2011–2016, during the third 
mandate). We concentrated on those three periods as the composition 
of the Constitutional Court in those periods remained more or less the 
same. As a result, we were able to thoroughly examine the decisions of 
the same compositions of all three mandates and reach more persuasive 
conclusions. 
Subsequently, for each year we selected about twenty of the most impor-
tant decisions from all three mandates. The decisions were chosen based 
on their importance, as they were identified in the annual reports of the 
Constitutional Court, as well as other criteria. More specifically, Avbelj and 
Šušteršič noted that the decisions were chosen on the basis of the following 
criteria: “decisions that the Court itself has declared as important in its an-
nual reports”; “decisions not taken unanimously, or with concurring or dis-
senting separate opinions”; “decisions on important legal and social issues 
that relate to our definition of the three ideological dimensions”; “decisions 
of a precedential character or with important social consequences”; and 
“decisions related to highly controversial issues in the political and public 
discussions” (Avbelj & Šušteršič, 2019, p. 148). We have thus examined, 
coded, and assessed 336 decisions of the Slovenian Constitutional Court.
After the selection, we first identified whether the decisions included eco-
nomic, social, and authoritarian dimensions of judicial ideology. Each de-
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cision does not contain all dimensions, however all of them include at least 
one. Data was thereafter generated for each of the dimensions. We then 
proceeded to hand-code each decision in the range of 1 to 5; from one to 
the other side of the ideological spectrum. Equally, the ideological position 
of potential counter-decisions was also hand-coded. We employed a mul-
ti-stage peer review process in order to ensure quality control and adequacy 
of each ideological position given to each of the decisions. The ideological 
position for each of the selected decisions was hand-coded by a member of 
the research team, who thereafter sent their assessment to another member 
of the research team (Avbelj et al., 2018). As a rule, all assessments were 
subjected to a rigorous and diligent peer-review process. In the case of dis-
agreements between the author of a report on a particular decision of the 
Constitutional Court and the peer reviewer, the draft was discussed at the 
regular meetings of the research group (Avbelj & Šušteršič, 2019, pp. 143–
144). All the researchers would read the draft report and dissenting opinion 
of the relevant reviewer, and the final positions were voted on among all the 
researchers, and in most cases adopted unanimously. In this way, we have 
attempted to eliminate bias(es) of individual reviewers.
For the purpose of this article, we will only present and analyse the re-
sults pertaining to the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology, as it 
is primarily connected to the research question (Avbelj et al., 2018). The 
authoritarian dimension, as Table 1 explains in detail below, measures 
whether a judge is more inclined to protect the human rights of indi-
viduals (position 1), or favours the protection of state interests (position 
5) (Avbelj & Šušteršič, 2019, pp. 143–144). To be clear, we have distin-
guished between the authoritarian and social dimension of judicial ideol-
ogy. Whereas the authoritarian dimension measures the relationship be-
tween individual rights and the authority and stability of the legal system, 
the social dimension studies the relationship between the individual or 
minority interests and the majoritarian interests and rights of the majori-
ty. The middle position (3) signifies a position that attempts to reconcile 
individual rights with the interests of the state and society at large (ibid). 
The authoritarian dimension measures the respect of individual rights in 
the vertical relationship between the individual and the state and its le-
gal system. Position 1 is traditionally associated with the left and posi-
tion 5 with the right ideological positions, whereas position 3 represents 
a middle position between individual and state interests. For instance, a 
decision on freedom of expression has been placed in position 1 or 2 if it 
protected the individual free speech against unjustified state intervention. 
On the contrary, the decision would have been placed in position 4 or 5 
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if it had favoured state intervention and showed preference for the pres-
ervation of the existing legal order. Moreover, positions 1 and 5 signify a 
strong ideological position, whereas positions 2, 3 and 4 portray moderate 
ideological positions (ibid, p. 145). Those positions are more clearly ex-
plained in Table 1 below.







Protection of individual rights against (arbitrary) interference by the state. 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms enjoy preference over state in-
terference. The authoritarian dimension includes protection of both abso-
lute and relative rights. The state does not have discretion to limit absolute 
rights, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture and prohibition of 
forced and slave labour. Individual rights have priority over the stability 
and authority of public order.
2
Human rights are important for the functioning of the society, however, 
they can be interfered with under justified reasons, such as the protection 
of public safety, public order or public health among others. Individual 
rights can be interfered with if justified and necessary in a democratic 
society. This position is closer to the protection of individual freedom and 
liberty than to the protection of state interests.
3
This position attempts to find a reasonable balance between individual 
rights and the authority and stability of state order and respect for the 
rules. All decisions should be delivered on the basis of the principle of 
proportionality. Both the values, individual rights and the preservation of 
state interests are essential for the functioning of the society, however, the 
stability of the legal order should not be underestimated in a democratic 
society.
4
The stability and authority of the state, its interests and its legal order 
has, in general, priority over the protection of individual rights. Individual 
rights have to be protected in the light of general interests of the state. 
As a result, this ideological point presents a position that is closer to the 
protection of the authority and the stability of the state legal order and is 
more distant from the freedom and liberty of individuals. 
5
Stability and authority of the public order and the existing legal system 
has preference over individual rights regardless of their nature. Individual 
rights should take backseat to the benefit of state intervention and state 
interests. Individuals are to strictly obey the rules of the existing system 
and the authority of the state.
Source: Author.
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The ideological positions of an individual mandate of the Constitutional 
Court and of an individual judge have been calculated on the basis of the 
sum of the number of times the decisions have been placed in a particular 
position (Avbelj et al., 2018, p. 6). The relative frequencies have been 
calculated on the basis of this number and they indicate the intensity 
of preferences for each position (ibid). The ideal ideological points have 
been calculated as the weighted average of all positions (1–5) in all deci-
sions (ibid).
Such a methodological approach has, after several years of research work, 
generated sets of empirical data that among others contribute to answer-
ing the main research question. It demonstrates to a large extent how 
the Slovenian Constitutional Court has operated and formed consensus 
or dissent. The empirical data quite clearly illustrate whether a particu-
lar mandate of the Constitutional Court has been more biased towards 
protecting individual rights or has preferred to protect the authority and 
stability of the existing legal order. As the next section shows, some man-
dates and judges have been more prejudiced towards defending govern-
mental interests, while others have appeared to protect individual rights. 
As a result, the data also directly offers comparisons between different 
mandates and judges within a particular mandate concerning the author-
itarian dimension of judicial ideologies. All in all, the research has pro-
duced very clear findings as to the judicial ideology of each of the first 
three mandates of the existence of the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
and its members, thereby providing a basis for future research, such as 
comparing the judicial ideology of the Constitutional Court to that of the 
political parties that elected the constitutional judges. 
3.  Ideological Positions of the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court Concerning the 
Authoritarian Dimension of Judicial Ideology
This section describes and explains the ideological profiles of all three 
mandates of the Slovenian Constitutional Court and its judges concern-
ing the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology. For each of the 
mandates, it first discusses the ideological profile and ideal points of the 
full mandate of the Constitutional Court. It then presents and analyses 
the ideological positions of a typical decision of the examined mandate. 
Thirdly, it presents the findings of the research of individual judges in 
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the examined mandates of the Constitutional Court on both sides of the 
ideological spectrum, referring to those judges who have most explicitly 
protected individual rights or those who show greater preference for the 
protection of collective interests as protected in the legal system. The fig-
ures below illustrate, for each mandate of the Court, the ideological pro-
file and ideal points of the Court concerning the authoritarian dimension. 
3.1.  The First Mandate of the Constitutional Court 
(1993–1997)
The first mandate of the Constitutional Court has sought a balance be-
tween the restoration of individual rights and the authority of the newly 
formed Slovenian state. Figure 1 illustrates that the ideal points of the 
most important decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court in the pe-
riod 1993–1997 concerning the authoritarian dimension rest in position 
2.7. This position shows that the first mandate was perhaps slightly more 
inclined to protect state interests and the stability of the newly formed 
legal system than individual rights and freedoms. However, it is still locat-
ed close to the middle of the ideological position between the protection 
of individual rights and the preservation of authority and stability of the 
existing legal order. Nonetheless, Figure 1 demonstrates that the exam-
ined decisions of the 1993–1997 period of the Constitutional Court have 
been almost proportionally spread over all 5 ideological positions, with 
the highest number of decisions being located in positions 1 and 2, which 
favour the protection of individual rights. 
In order to explain the coding of the decisions delivered in the period be-
tween 1993 and 1997, let us make our discussion more concrete and look 
at the coding for the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology for one 
of the decisions of the first mandate. The Constitutional Court, in the 
decision U-I-304/96 concerning legislative referenda, was not convinced 
by the arguments of the National Assembly (Constitutional Court of Slo-
venia, U-I-304/96, 7 November 1996). It held that it would not be possible 
to hold a referendum and election on the same day, nor was it convinced 
by the argument that there would be a mix of elections and referendum 
on the same day, as well as election and pre-referendum campaigns (ibid). 
The Constitutional Court therefore found the third and fourth point of the 
Decree, calling a legislative referendum for the elections to the National 
Assembly, unconstitutional, since the Referendum and People’s Initiative 
Act does not provide the power to postpone the referendum day (ibid).
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Figure 1: Ideological profile and ideal points of the Constitutional Court 
(1993–1997) concerning the authoritarian dimension
Source: Author.2
Explanation: The horizontal axis represents the ideological position, whereas the vertical axis 
illustrates the number of decisions/judgments for each position. The ideal ideological point 
is referenced by a red vertical line.
Table 2. Measurement of the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology in the 
decision U-I-304/96 concerning legislative referenda
AUTHORITARIAN DIMENSION 1 2 3 4 5








CSO1 (Concurring Separate Opinion): Testen 2
CSO2 (Concurring Separate Opinion): 
Jambrek
2
PDSO1 (Partially Dissenting Separate 
Opinion): Jerovšek
2
2 The author is grateful to Professor Janez Šušteršič for his contribution in the tech-
nical elaboration of the figures 1-15.
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DSO1 (Dissenting Separate Opinion): Krivic 2
DSO2 Dissenting Separate Opinion: Ude, 
Šinkovec
2
Only against: / 1 1
Only for: Snoj, Šturm, Zupančič 0,5 1 1
Source: Author.
We have located the authoritative dimension in the relationship between 
the protection of the right of the petitioners to call a referendum and the 
government’s own interference with it. The decision has a position 2 as 
the Constitutional Court found the illegality of the third and fourth points 
of the Decree on amendments to the call for a legislative referendum 
for elections to the National Assembly. However, it could not remedy its 
unlawful consequences. The decision therefore does not have position 1 
as the Constitutional Court has only abstractly protected the right of the 
petitioners to call for the referendum. The Counter-Decision is located 
in position 5, as the Constitutional Court would have, in this case, com-
pletely rejected the petitioners’ arguments about alleged interferences 
with their constitutional and legal rights, thus preserving the stability and 
authority of the legal order. 
Judge Testen’s Concurring Separate Opinion (CSO1) holds position 2, as 
his arguments are similar to those in the decision, i.e., that the contested 
points of the decree were found to be unlawful. Judge Jambrek’s CSO2 
is in position 2, arguing that the rights of the petitioners to call the ref-
erendum have been eroded, however he has not proposed concrete steps 
to enforce the illegality. Judge Jerovšek’s PDSO holds position 1, sug-
gesting that the Constitutional Court would only set a legal day to hold 
the referendum. In contrast, the Dissenting Separate Opinion (DSO1) 
of Judge Krivic holds position 5, favouring the authority and stability of 
the constitutional order over individual rights. At the same time, he did 
not find failure to comply with a previous decision of the Constitutional 
Court. Judge Ude’s DSO2, joined by Judge Šinkovec, holds position 5, as 
the judge did not agree with the majority. He emphasized that there were 
substantiated reasons for the postponement of the referendum.
As Figure 2 illustrates, among the judges of the first mandate, Judge Jer-
ovšek has scored the highest score on the ideological scale between polit-
ical liberalism and individual rights, and state intervention. His position 
is to the left of the middle position between individual rights and state 
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intervention. He has been closely followed by the voting patterns of Judge 
Šturm, as seen in Figure 3, who at the Constitutional Court engineered 
the normative break-up with the authoritarian system and its systemat-
ic human rights violations. On the other side of the spectrum, Figure 
4 shows that judge Ude has favoured the protection of state interests 
against individual rights. His ideal ideological point is located in position 
3.0, which is much closer to the protection of state interests than individ-
ual interests. Nonetheless, his voting pattern has not been far removed 
from the middle of the ideological positions. Similarly, Judge Snoj has 
also given preference to state intervention and the authority and stability 
of the existing legal system (Figure 5). The authoritarian dimension of the 
rest of the judges of that mandate is located between the positions of the 
ideological profiles of those judges. 
Figure 2: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Jerovšek of the 
Constitutional Court (1993–1997) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Figure 3: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Šturm of the 
Constitutional Court (1993–1997) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
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Figure 4: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Ude of the 
Constitutional Court (1993–1997) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Figure 5: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Snoj of the 
Constitutional Court (1993–1997) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Source: Author.
3.2.  The Second Mandate of the Constitutional Court 
(2002–2006)
The ideological profile and ideal points are slightly different for the sec-
ond mandate of the Constitutional Court. Empirical research shows that 
the ideal points of the most important decisions delivered by the Consti-
tutional Court in the period between 2002 and 2006 have even stronger 
preference for individual rights in relation to state intervention (with the 
ideological ideal in position 2.4). Most decisions are located in the ideo-
logical position 2 and very few in position 5, as this position favours the 
stability of public order the most. The majority has shown greater prefer-
ence for political rights than the authority and stability of the legal order. 
This is somehow surprising, as in the literature the second mandate of the 
Constitutional Court has not been known for protecting individual rights 
over state intervention, nonetheless the presence of some judges favour-
ing individual rights may have turned the balance in favour of individual 
rights.
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Figure 6: Ideological profile and ideal points of the Constitutional Court 
(2002–2006) concerning the authoritarian dimension
Source: Author.
Let us illustrate the authoritarian dimension of the second mandate by 
measuring the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology in the decision 
U-I-246/02 concerning the “erased” (Constitutional Court of Slovenia, 
U-I-246/02, 7 April 2003). The Constitutional Court consensually decid-
ed that the Law regulating the status of citizens of other successor states 
of the former Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia violates the Consti-
tution, since the citizens of other republics of the former Yugoslavia were 
not recognized permanent residence as of 26 February 1992 (ibid). At the 
same time, it found that the same Act was unconstitutional as it did not 
regulate the acquisition of permanent residence for persons who had been 
forcefully removed under Article 28 of the Aliens Act (ibid). 
Table 3. Measurement of the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology in the 
decision U-I-246/02 concerning the “erased”
Authoritarian dimension 1 2 3 4 5
Position of decision (D) and counter-decision (CD) D CD
Position of Separate Opinion CS0
Concurring Separate Opinion (CSO): Ribičič 2
FOR: Everyone else 1 1 1 1
Source: Author.
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The Constitutional Court prioritized the right to regulate the legal po-
sition of citizens of other successor states of the former Yugoslavia in 
the Republic of Slovenia. It protected their human dignity in relation to 
maintaining the stability and authority of the existing legal order. It found 
that the rights of citizens of other successor states of the former Yugosla-
via in the Republic of Slovenia take precedence over the protection and 
stability of the existing legal order. The decision has position 1, as the 
Constitutional Court ordered the National Assembly to remedy constitu-
tional inconsistencies in the short term and also because of point 8 of the 
operative provision, which gives citizens from other successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia the right to regulate their 
status already on the basis of this decision.
In his concurring separate opinion, Judge Ribičič argued that the Consti-
tutional Court should have adopted an interpretative decision concerning 
the impugned provisions of the Act, as it does not regulate the acquisition 
of a permanent place of residence for persons under the Law regulating 
the status of citizens of other successor states of the former Yugoslavia 
in the Republic of Slovenia. His CSO has therefore position 2 notwith-
standing the fact that the judge ultimately supported the decision of the 
majority, which found the unconstitutionality of the existing normative 
framework.
The counter-decision states that the Constitutional Court would have 
confirmed the legality of the law in force and would thus have given pri-
ority to the authoritative nature of the normative order, regardless of the 
potential controversy of the legal provisions. Therefore, it is located in 
position 5. 
As Figures 7 and 8 show, Judges Wedam Lukić and Ribičič have been 
among the judges of the second mandate that have mostly favoured in-
dividual rights and political liberal rights (both of them in position 2.3). 
Both of them rarely voted for state interests and the preservation and 
stability of the legal order. Not surprisingly, only a few of their examined 
decisions have been ranked in the ideological position 5. Figure 7 shows 
that Judge Ribičič’s decisions have been predominantly located in the ide-
ological positions 2 and 1, favouring individual rights. Similarly, Judge 
Wedam Lukić has, as seen from Figure 8 mostly voted in the ideological 
position 2. In contrast, the ideological profile and ideal points of Judge 
Krisper Kramberger are located in position 2.6, which illustrates that she 
has slightly favoured state interests and the stability of the legal order over 
individual rights. Moreover, one can find Judge Modrijan in the middle of 
the ideological positions (Figure 10). 
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Figure 7: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Ribičič of the 
Constitutional Court (2002–2006) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Figure 8: Ideological profile and ide-
al points of Judge Wedam Lukić of the 
Constitutional Court (2002–2006) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Figure 9: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Krisper Kram-
berger of the Constitutional Court 
(2002–2006) concerning the author-
itarian dimension
Figure 10: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Modrijan of the 
Constitutional Court (2002–2006) 



























3.3.  The Third Mandate of the Constitutional Court 
(2011–2016)
The ideological profile and ideal points of the third mandate of the Con-
stitutional Court are located in position 2.0. Such a position illustrates 
that the third mandate favoured individual rights and political liberalism 
over the stability and authority of the legal order. It appears that the third 
mandate has shown slightly more preference towards the protection of in-
dividual rights than the first mandate. Such contestation rests also on the 
fact that the highest number of examined decisions were located in the 
ideological position 1, followed by position 2, whereas the lowest number 
of decisions are located in positions 3, 4, and 5, which generally advance 
the stability of the legal order. Thus, the research reveals that the third 
mandate of the Constitutional Court has been located to the left of the 
centre of the possible ideological positions.
Figure 11: Ideological profile and ideal points of the Constitutional Court 
(2011–2016) concerning the authoritarian dimension
Source: Author.
Let us illustrate the authoritarian dimension of the third mandate by 
measuring the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology in the deci-
sion Up-584/12 concerning freedom of expression (Constitutional Court 
of Slovenia, Up-584/12, 22 May 2014). The ordinary courts ordered the 
complainant to pay compensation for his offensive statements made on 
his television show Hribar and in interviews with various media (ibid). 
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The Constitutional Court agreed with the complainant’s arguments and 
reversed the judgment of the Higher Court and the Ljubljana District 
Court and remitted the case to the District Court for a re-examination 
(ibid). It explained that the ordinary courts had not sufficiently and ad-
equately assessed the context of the case, especially in terms of how the 
statement was made and for whom it was intended, as well as the extent 
to which the appellant’s freedom of artistic expression is protected in the 
case of value judgments (ibid).
Table 4. Measurement of the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology in the 
decision Up-584/12 concerning freedom of expression
Authoritorian dimension 1 2 3 4 5
Position of decision and counter-decision D CD
FOR: Everyone else 1 1 1 1
Source: Author.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court reversed the judgments of the 
ordinary courts as they did not adequately and sufficiently assess the con-
text of the constitutional complaint, especially the extent of the protec-
tion of the complainant’s freedom of artistic expression in the case of 
value judgments and other relevant issues. In doing so, it favoured the 
rights of the complainant to express himself artistically over the stabili-
ty and authoritative nature of the legal system. Therefore, the decision 
is located in position 1. The Counter-decision has a position of 5, since 
the Constitutional Court would have completely rejected the complain-
ant’s arguments and would have favoured the authoritarian nature of the 
normative order, finding that there was no violation of the complainant’s 
right to artistic and satirical expression.
As for individual judges of the third mandate, Judges Sovdat and Mozetič, 
as demonstrated by Figures 12 and 13, have most favoured individual 
rights and political rights (both in position 2.1), and rarely voted for 
state interests and the preservation and stability of the legal order. Not 
surprisingly, none of their examined decisions have been ranked in the 
ideological position 5, which mostly favours state interests. On the oth-
er hand, the ideological profile and ideal points of Judges Klampfer and 
Pogačar, as presented by figures 14 and 15, illustrate that they have fa-
voured state interests and the stability of the legal order. For instance, 
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figure 14 demonstrates that the highest score (2.8) in the preference for 
state intervention was found in the voting patterns of Judge Klampfer, 
who preferred state interference over the protection of individual rights 
in the majority of the decisions. Figure 15 illustrates that Judge Pogačar 
has been very close to the balance between the two ideological positions, 
thereby placing only a slight preference for stability and the preservation 
of the existing legal order. 
Figure 12: Ideological profile and ide-
al points of Judge Sovdat of the Con-
stitutional Court (2011–2016) con-
cerning the authoritarian dimension
Figure 13: Ideological profile and ide-
al points of Judge Mozetič of the Con-
stitutional Court (2011–2016) con-
cerning the authoritarian dimension
Figure 14: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Klampfer of the 
Constitutional Court (2011–2016) 
concerning the authoritarian dimen-
sion
Figure 15: Ideological profile and 
ideal points of Judge Pogačar of the 
Constitutional Court (2011–2016) 









4. Relevance of the Results
Our research illustrates that all three examined mandates of the Consti-
tutional Court find themselves somewhere in the middle of the authori-
tarian dimension of judicial ideology. More specifically, the second and 
third mandate of the Constitutional Court have been located to the left 
of the centre of possible ideological positions, whereas the first mandate 
is positioned slightly to the right. Surprisingly, our research points out 
that the first mandate has been the most authoritarian in the sense that 
it protected the stability and authority of the newly-formed legal order 
of democratic and independent Slovenia. The first mandate of the Con-
stitutional Court was occupied with establishing formal standards of the 
rule of law and dealing with human rights violations of the past (Avbelj & 
Letnar Černič, 2020). Its role has been perhaps more difficult as it had 
to restore or re-establish individual rights and the rule of law after several 
decades of authoritarian rule.
The second (2002–2006) and third mandates (2011–2016) of the Con-
stitutional Court have been perhaps more favourable to individual rights 
and therefore slightly less authoritarian than the first. The analysis of the 
decisions of the second mandate demonstrates that at least some of the 
judges have been very open to the application of foreign and internation-
al jurisprudence through comparative and international legal arguments 
(ibid). Also, some of the most authoritarian judges are found in the first 
mandate. Perhaps one of the reasons for their authoritarian judicial ide-
ology can be found in the fact that those judges established the new rule 
of law standards from the ground up and placed individual rights at the 
centre of the constitutional order. All in all, our investigation into the au-
thoritarian dimension of judicial ideology at the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court demonstrates that the ideology was clearly present in its judicial de-
cision-making and that all three mandates found themselves (with slight 
variations) at the centre of the ideological spectrum; somewhere between 
the protection of individual rights and the preservation of the authority 
and stability of the existing legal system. 
Our research has generated rich results concerning various aspects of judi-
cial decision-making and the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology 
at the Constitutional Court in its three mandates. The results are relevant 
in various contexts. First, the empirical data demonstrate which mandates 
and individual judges showed greater preference for individual rights and 
which judges gave preference to state interests, as well as the differences 
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and similarities between them. They allow us to understand more closely 
how three mandates of the Constitutional Court have decided cases and 
their relationship between individual rights, political liberalism, state in-
terests and the preservation and stability of the existing legal order.
Measuring and analysing the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideolo-
gy of the Constitutional Courts contributes to the understanding of how 
its different mandates have formed and reached decisions. In turn, such 
analysis assists in augmenting the legitimacy and credibility of its deci-
sions (Avbelj, 2019). It also explains the differences and similarities be-
tween different mandates of the Constitutional Court. As a result, it can 
be discerned how consent and dissent have been formed at the Consti-
tutional Court. In this way, one can compare and analyse an individual 
judge’s ideological position with that of the political parties which elected 
a particular judge to the position of judge at the Constitutional Court. 
Secondly, the results prove that the ideological position has been an in-
fluential factor in the decision-making of all three mandates of the Con-
stitutional Court. Almost all examined decisions portray one or more 
ideological positions with the authoritarian dimension being the most 
present. The findings have confirmed that the Constitutional Court has 
been more inclined to favour a discursive approach to law, which rests on 
the exchange and persuasiveness of different arguments, which are often 
subject to the ideological positions of judges deriving from their family, 
private and professional lives and backgrounds (Avbelj, 2019). It shows 
that the decision-making at the Constitutional Court has only rarely been 
paved by the objectivist approach to law that submits that judges decide 
cases objectively and politically neutrally, and the resolution of disputes 
proceed only by the technical application of a legal norm. It also enables 
the first insights into the psychological aspects of judicial ideology at the 
Constitutional Court, especially the relationship between the judges (Ep-
stein, 2016). The presence of judicial ideology reinforces the importance 
of legal argumentation and the persuasiveness of legal arguments to reach 
a decision in a particular case. As a result, it calls for better use of the 
methods of legal argumentation in deciding individual cases.
Thirdly, the ideology is therefore clearly present in judicial-decision mak-
ing. The scope and nature of judicial-decision making often depends on 
the nature of the legal norm and legal dispute. When a legal norm is de-
finitive and closed in nature, there will be less scope for the presence of 
judicial ideology (Avbelj, 2019). In contrast, where legal norms allow for 
more open interpretation, the space for ideology also increases. Addition-
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ally, the extent of judicial ideology at the Constitutional Court depends 
on the quality of the legal system. This could explain why the empirical 
data have shown that the first mandate of the Constitutional Court was a 
bit more authoritarian than the ensuing two.
Judges of the first mandate spent most of their professional careers in 
the former authoritarian system, which favoured the authority of the law 
much more than the rule of law and individual rights. Such a pattern can 
also be seen in the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology of the first 
mandate. In contrast, the second and third mandates were distanced from 
the former socialist system and more accustomed to the language of the 
rule of law and human rights, developed by the first mandate. The second 
and third mandates of the Constitutional Court were able to translate 
those formal standards to the judicial decision-making in concrete cas-
es. As a result, the authoritarian dimension of the judicial ideology of 
the second and particularly third mandate were slightly less authoritarian. 
Therefore, the second and third mandate find themselves to the left of 
the centre of ideological positions. More research would be needed to ex-
amine whether individual judicial decision-making at the Constitutional 
Court was also influenced by personal family, private, and professional 
experience (Grossman, 1966; Harris & Sen, 2019).
Fourthly, examination of the ideological position of all three mandates 
concerning the authoritarian dimension illustrates how authoritarian a 
particular mandate was in exercising its judicial mandate for the protec-
tion of individual rights and constitutional review. Additionally, the re-
sults could be employed in the research of judicial ideology of the current 
and future mandates of the Constitutional Court, which are also asked 
to navigate between individual rights and the authority and stability of 
the legal system. The empirical data illustrate that since its creation, the 
judges of the Constitutional Court have been very ideological. We noted 
earlier that “courts and judges need to be aware of and accept the political 
nature of their actions, which is why they must carefully ensure that they 
act as publicly as possible and that they judge impartially, independent-
ly and fairly in an effort to improve the quality of their judgments. The 
people on whose behalf they judge will only accept their decisions if they 
are delivered on the basis of persuasive and in-depth legal arguments and 
without the presence of actual and potential conflicts of interest. Com-
pelling legal argumentation, in fact, disproves the political conditionality 
of every judge, since a judgment or voice stands or falls with solid and in-
depth legal arguments” (Letnar Černič, 22. 9. 2017). The research affirms 
that most of the mandates of the Constitutional Court have recognized 
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such a challenge and have worked towards satisfying those requirements 
of legal reasoning.
5. Conclusion
This article argues that ideology has undoubtedly been a deciding factor 
in the decision-making of the Slovenian Constitutional Court. The ob-
jectivist approach to law, which has been prevalent in recent decades in 
Slovenia and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, argues that there 
is no room for the influence of ideology in judicial decision-making. It 
argues that reaching a decision in a judicial dispute is merely a technical 
process of applying legal norms to given facts. However, our empirical 
research has shown that the decision-making at the Slovenian Constitu-
tional Court has been overwhelmingly ideological, which in some cases 
has been more and in others less visible. All three analysed mandates of 
the Constitutional Court reached their decisions in most cases concern-
ing constitutional complaints and constitutional review based on three 
dimensions of their judicial ideology. As a result, this article aimed to 
examine how much this judicial ideology is present in the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court by answering the question of how authoritarian it 
has been in the first three mandates of its existence. 
Our research illustrates that all three mandates find themselves more or 
less in the central ideological positions concerning the authoritarian di-
mension of judicial ideology, namely somewhere in the middle between 
protecting individual rights and preserving the authority and stability 
of the existing system. For this reason, the first three mandates of the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court cannot be described as authoritarian in 
their decision-making. Nonetheless, the second and third mandates of 
the Constitutional Court were slightly more inclined to protect individual 
rights against the authority of the state and stability of legal orders than 
the first mandate. The research data illustrate that some judges during 
those first three mandates of the Constitutional Court were more author-
itarian in their judicial decision-making than others.
The recognition that the Constitutional Court has been embedded with 
judicial ideology is important for its judges in order to reinforce the re-
spect for human dignity, pluralism, and the rule of law. It is now clear that 
the judges of the Slovenian Constitutional Court do not decide cases like 
robots and are not ideologically neutral. They are like any other human 
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being; products of their family, private, and professional environments, 
which in almost every case influence their decision-making. Nonetheless, 
judges are capable of exercising their judicial functions professionally by 
focusing on strong argumentation and the persuasiveness of legal argu-
mentation. The empirical research has illustrated that reliance on the ob-
jectivist perception of the law in the Slovenian domestic legal system has 
been erroneous. It has often been employed to hide arbitrary abuses of 
the rule of law and conflicts of interest when exercising judicial tasks. The 
objective of this article has been to present and analyse empirical results 
concerning the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology at the Slove-
nian Constitutional Court. The results therefore confirm the hypothesis 
that judges have been overwhelmingly ideological when deciding cases. 
The Constitutional Court and its judges have been very much present in 
the social environment of the Slovenian society and its decisions have re-
flected on their ideology. The presence of judicial ideology at the Consti-
tutional Court calls for even greater emphasis on the discursive approach 
in its judicial-making. It also advocates for more transparency in the selec-
tion procedures for new judges. All in all, discursive, argumentative, and 
transparent approaches to the law should become commonplace in order 
to more effectively protect values of human dignity, pluralism, broad-
mindedness, and the rule of law.
Finally, the data allow ample opportunities for future research. For in-
stance, our research should trigger further analyses on whether the judi-
cial ideology of judges corresponds to ideology that an individual judge 
portrayed in their scholarship, teaching, and civil society engagement be-
fore they were elected to the Constitutional Court. Also, it appears that 
there is some correlation between the ideological position of individual 
judges and those of political parties that elected them in the National 
Assembly to the position of Constitutional Court judges. Additionally, 
much more detailed and in-depth research is required as to the impact 
of the legislative and executive branches on the judicial ideology of the 
Constitutional Court. Moreover, the inter-relationship between ideology 
at the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court is another gap, which 
future research could fill.
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AUTHORITARIAN DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY 
OF THE SLOVENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Summary
After the democratization and independence of Slovenia, the Constitutional 
Court has generated the paradigm reform in the Slovenian constitutional system 
by protecting individual rights against the heritage of the former system. The 
constitutional judges are not blank slates, but individuals embedded in their 
private and professional environments. In the past three decades, the Court has 
delivered several seminal decisions concerning the protection of the rule of law, 
human rights, and constitutional democracy. What motivates constitutional 
judges to protect individual rights in some cases and show preference for the 
preservation of authority and stability of the existing legal system in others? 
The article is based on an empirical research measuring the presence of judicial 
ideology at the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in the selected periods of 1993–
1997, 2002–2006, and 2011–2016 within the first three eight-year mandates. 
The methodological and theoretical model aims to measure economic, social, 
and authoritarian dimensions of judicial ideology (three-fold judicial ideology 
model). The research group has analysed the decisions and separate opinions 
of the Constitutional Court from selected periods based on hypotheses provided 
by the model. This article intends to present and analyse the research results 
concerning the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology. More specifically, 
it examines the level of authoritarianism of the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
in its judicial decision-making during the three mentioned mandates. Through 
the obtained empirical results, the paper seeks to strengthen fair, impartial, and 
independent functioning of the Slovenian Constitutional Court and its respec-
tive judges. 
Keywords: judicial ideology, Slovenian Constitutional Court, the rule of law, 
constitutional democracy, human rights 
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AUTORITARNA DIMENZIJA SUDSKE IDEOLOGIJE 
SLOVENSKOG USTAVNOG SUDA
Sažetak
U razdoblju nakon demokratizacije i neovisnosti, Ustavni sud proveo je bit-
nu promjenu slovenskog ustavnog sustava prema zaštiti pojedinačnih prava, 
naspram naslijeđa bivšeg sustava. Ustavni suci nisu prazne ploče nego oso-
be koje žive u svojoj privatnoj i profesionalnoj okolini. U protekla tri desetl-
jeća Sud je donio nekoliko važnih odluka koje se odnose na vladavinu prava, 
ljudska prava i ustavnu demokraciju. Što je potaklo ustavne suce da u nekim 
slučajevima zaštite pojedinačna prava, a u drugima preferiraju zaštitu vlasti i 
stabilnost postojećeg pravnog sustava? Rad se temelji na empirijskom mjerenju 
sudske ideologije u tri mandata (1993.–1997., 2002.–2006., 2011.–2016.). 
Metodološki i teorijski model mjeri ekonomsku, socijalnu i autoritarnu dimen-
ziju sudske ideologije (trokomponentni model ideologije). Istraživačka skupi-
na je analizirala odluke i izdvojena mišljenja iz odabranih razdoblja prema 
odrednicama tog modela. Svrha ovog rada je prezentirati i analizirati dobivene 
rezultate koji se odnose na autoritarnu dimenziju sudske ideologije, odnosno 
utvrditi koliko je autoritaran bio slovenski Ustavni sud u donošenju odluka u 
tri navedena mandata. Kroz to se želi ojačati pošteno, nepristrano i neovisno 
djelovanje slovenskog Ustavnog suda i njegovih pojedinačnih sudaca. 
Ključne riječi: sudska ideologija, Ustavni sud Republike Slovenije, vladavina 
prava, ustavna demokracija, ljudska prava 
